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ABSTRACT
Behavioral Targeting (BT) in the past few years has seen a great up-
surge in commercial as well as research interest. To make advertis-
ing campaigns more effective, advertisers look to target more rele-
vant users. Ad-networks and other data collectors, such as, Cellular
Service Providers (CSPs), hold a treasure trove of user information
that is extremely valuable to advertisers. Moreover, these players
may have complimentary sets of data. Combining and using data
from different collectors can be very useful for advertising. How-
ever, in the trade of data among the various players, it is currently
unclear how a price can be attached to a certain piece of informa-
tion. This work contributes (i) a MOdel of the Value of INformation
Granularity (MoVInG) that captures the impact of additional infor-
mation on the revenue from targeted ads in case of uniform bidding
and (ii) an expression that is applicable in more general scenarios.
We apply MoVInG to a user data-set from a large CSP to evaluate
the ﬁnancial beneﬁt of precise user data.
1. INTRODUCTION
The budget invested in Behavioral Targeting (BT) in the year
2012 is estimated to be $4.4 billion [6]. In the year 2009, 24%
of online marketers used BT [7] a 50% increase from the previous
year. Studies show that the conversion rates (i.e., fraction of people
who buy an item/service after seeing its ad) of targeted advertise-
ments are twice that of the non-targeted ones [5].
In order to make targeting more effective for advertisers, ad-
networks not only collect user data, e.g., browsing behavior, demo-
graphics, etc., but also trade the user-data with each other (while
adhering to their privacy terms and conditions) [8, 14]. However, it
is unclear what price tag can be attached to a certain piece of infor-
mation. For example, what is the impact of ﬁner-granularity user-
data on the conversion rate and consequently on the revenue that
ad-networks might expect from targeted ads? Consider, for exam-
ple, a car dealer in San Francisco, California, who wants to adver-
tise a special offer available to people living in her city. A data-set
with coarse-granularity, e.g., with residence information at the state
level, is of less use compared to a data-set that has city level infor-
mation. In fact, ads placed using the state-level data-set will likely
reach many people not interested in the offer. Consequently, the
conversion rate for ads placed based on the ﬁner-grained data-set
will likely be higher and thus such a data-set is more valuable.
Currently, most of the user proﬁles are collected by partner net-
works of the web services that the users visit. By combining the
history of the user footprints at each partner service, the players in
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the ad industry form a picture of the user’s proﬁle. This service-side
proﬁling method lacks ways to combine information from multi-
ple devices, multiple browsers, and web services that are not part-
ners in proﬁle collection. There are other players, e.g., ISPs, CSPs,
who can build rich and ﬁne-grained user data-sets by proﬁling their
users. This network-side proﬁling can be extremely valuable for
targeting because as long as a user is on the same edge ISP (or
CSP), her data can be collected regardless of her devices, OSes,
services, etc. However, in order for these players to take full advan-
tage of the beneﬁt their data can offer, they must be able to properly
price it. This work devises a MOdel of the Value of INformation
Granularity (MoVInG) by deriving expressions to quantify the im-
pact of such ﬁne-grained data on the revenue from advertising.
Challenges: Estimating the beneﬁt of ﬁne-grained user data is
challenging due to the following reasons: (1) lack of measures for
data quality that take into account different granularities for vari-
ous attributes; (2) several factors affecting competition among ad-
vertisers, e.g., different advertisers are interested in placing ads on
overlapping sets of users based on different attributes; (3) several
proprietary components, e.g., targeting algorithm. MoVInG does
not relate the impact of user data on the revenue to information
granularity explicitly, which can be extremely challenging given
the variety of aggregation levels of different attributes. Instead,
MoVInG derives the relationship between revenue from user data
and the number of redundant users that might be included in a target
set due to the lack of ﬁne-grained information.
Contributions: (i) We derive MoVInG to capture the difference
in revenue resulting from different data-sets, considering a pay-
per-impression payment model where advertisers pay based on the
number of ads (impressions) shown (Section 2.1). We assume a
single-sided auction market for ad slots, where advertisers draw
bids from a uniform distribution. (ii) We validate the obtained
model by simulating the auction under both the assumption of uni-
form bid distribution and more general bidding behaviors. Since
the information granularity value as computed by MoVInG refers
to a speciﬁc bidding scenario, (iii) we present a way of deriving
a more general expression, based on few input parameters and we
show that it ﬁts the simulation results very well (Section 2.2). Fi-
nally, (iv) we present concrete examples of the gain in revenue due
to improved user-data precision using the trafﬁc trace of a large
North-American CSP (Section 3).
2. REVENUE MODEL
Let D be a more precise data-set that has ﬁner-grained informa-
tion than a less precise D′. To quantify the impact of improved
precision, we want to derive the difference in the revenue of the
ad-network when ad targeting is based onD versusD′.
Figure 1 shows a schematic view of the players in the targeted ad-
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Figure 1: Advertisement placement architecture.
Notation Details
D Precise data-set
D′ Imprecise data-set
A Number of advertisers
U Total number of users in the system (inD andD′)
Q Advertisers’ query on user attributes in the data-set
SQ(S
′
Q
) User-set returned by query onD,Q(D) (D′,Q(D′))
S(S′) Expected size of SQ (S
′
Q
) over all queries
c(c′) Cost per impression/click when usingD (D′)
ai Attribute i of user information
vi Value for attribute i selected by queryQ
L Loss of revenue (between c and c′)
n(n′) Number of advertisers competing per slot inD (D′)
r Maximum possible bid of an advertiser
Table 1: Notations.
vertising architecture. Publishers ownwebsites (e.g., nytimes.com),
generate the content for them, and reserve ad spaces termed as slots.
Advertisers (e.g., car dealer in San Francisco) are interested in get-
ting the attention of the viewers of the web pages towards their
items/services by displaying ads. Ad-Networks (e.g., Google Ad-
Sense) are intermediaries deciding which ad is shown on which
publisher’s page. We consider the following ad placement archi-
tecture: (1) advertisers specify the user population they are inter-
ested in by means of a query Q (i.e., they are interested in users
satisfying Q). Q speciﬁes the values that selected user attributes
must have in order for the advertiser to be interested in a user; (2)
the ad-network returns a list of users SQ or S
′
Q who best match the
query Q(D) or Q(D′), depending on whether the ad-network by
itself or along with a partner data collector owns D or D′ and (3)
the advertisers, in turn, bid on the web page visits by any of the SQ
or S′Q users, and the winning advertiser’s ad is placed on the pub-
lisher’s pages. Note that our ﬁndings are general and are applicable
in other ad-placement scenarios e.g., where ad-network carries out
the ad-placement directly on the pages visited by the users.
Next we deﬁne the terms used. Valuation is the amount adver-
tisers consider an ad is worth and, consequently, it determines their
bids. Bid is the maximum amount an advertiser is willing to pay
to display an ad. Revenue is the gross income of an ad-network
resulting from targeted advertising before any expense deductions
and the cut to the publishers. Table 1 summarizes our notations.
2.1 Information Value Model
We identify two factors that affect ad-networks’ revenue: (i) val-
uation of the advertisers for the impression, which goes lower with
imprecise data-set, as explained in Section 1; and (ii) amount of
competition during the auction of each ad slot, which goes higher
with imprecise data-set. For example, consider the user sets re-
turned to one car dealer in San Francisco and another in Los An-
geles, both interested in local customers. They are disjoint when
based on data-set D (which has city level information for user lo-
cation), hence advertisers do not compete for any slot. However,
with D′ (which has only state level information), both advertisers
are returned a set of all users in California and consequently they
compete in advertising to common users. This artiﬁcial competi-
tion actually improves ad-networks’ revenue.
In the derivation, we adopt an incremental approach and at ﬁrst
consider an advertisement placement that is not based on auctions
and next consider ad auction scenarios.
Fixed Price Advertisements: Let’s consider a ﬁxed cost c and
c′ that an advertiser pays for target users based on data-set D and
D′, respectively. When using D′, ads are displayed to users who
are actually not in the target audience because SQ ∈ S
′
Q. Hence
impression cost c′ < c. We assume c′ = c ∗ S
S′
, the intuition being
that the advertiser will be willing to pay only for the fraction of ads
shown to the real target audience, i.e., the fraction of the users in
S′Q that also belong to SQ. Hence loss of revenue per impression:
L = c− c′ = c(1−
S
S′
) (1)
Auction-based Advertisements: We derive MoVInG in the auc-
tion scenario described below to capture artiﬁcial competition.
• Second price auction (or Vickrey auction) [15], where each im-
pression is auctioned off separately. From the revenue equiv-
alence theorem, the expected revenue at equilibrium is equal
to the expected revenue from a ﬁrst price auction. In a sec-
ond price auction, the winner is the bidder who bids the highest
amount, but only pays the second highest bidder’s bid amount.
This incentivizes bidders to bid their true valuations [13].
• Bids drawn form uniform distribution U(0, r) (relaxed later).
This assumption has been used in [12, 3].
• When targeting is based on a less precise data-set D′, the con-
version rate decreases proportionally to S
S′
. Although in gen-
eral advertisers may resort to very complex strategies to esti-
mate the value of their ads (and to formulate their bids), it is
fair to assume that a decrease in conversion rate will be trans-
lated in a corresponding decrease in bids: b′ = b ∗ S
S′
. This
does not affect the value and generality of MoVInG as it can
be easily modiﬁed to accommodate the actual function that the
advertisers use to set their bids.
In this auction scenario, the ad-networks’ revenue is the expected
second maximum from the bid distribution. Since the actual bids
are drawn from a uniform distribution in the range [0, r] (i.e., U(0, r)),
the expected second maximum is a simple derivation known from [11].
ForD this results in a cost per impression c = n−1
n+1
∗ r, where n is
the average number of advertisers competing for an impression, r
is the maximum possible bid of an advertiser. Let the total number
of advertisers in the system be A and total number of users in the
system be U , the average competition per impression is n = A∗S
U
.
Substituting in above equation, c = A∗S−U
A∗S+U
∗ r. Similarly, with
D′: c′ = A∗S
′
−U
A∗S′+U
∗ r′, where r′ = r ∗ S
S′
is the new upper limit
for the range of bids. Thus c′ = A∗S
′
−U
A∗S′+U
∗ r ∗ S
S′
. Hence the loss
in revenue for an ad-network as given by MoVInG is:
L = c− c′ = r ∗ (
A ∗ S − U
A ∗ S + U
−
A ∗ S′ − U
A ∗ S′ + U
∗
S
S′
) (2)
Results: Here we compare MoVInG with ﬁxed price ad place-
ment (No Auction curve) and with simulations. Figure 3 and the
following ones plot the fraction of revenue lost by ad-networks,
i.e., the loss expression in Eq. 1 (No Auction) or Eq. 2 (MoV-
InG) or loss obtained in simulations, divided by the original rev-
enue with data-set D (obtained in that particular case). We set
A = 100, U = 1000, S = 100, and vary S′. The simulation
curves capture the contention among the A advertisers by emulat-
ing their bidding behavior as described in Figure 2.
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1 Pick U users
2 PickA advertisers and assign bids picked from the chosen distribution
(e.g., uniform distribution in Fig 3)
3 for each advertiser:
4 assign S number of interested users (for data-set D)
5 assign S′ number of interested users (for data-setD′)
6 Create data structureB,B′
(for each user, all the interested advertisers for data-setsD,D′)
7 Create payment sets P and P ′
8 for each user inB:
9 P [user] = second highest bid
10 for each user inB′:
11 P ′[user] = second highest bid
12 L = average(P ) − average(P ′)
Figure 2: Pseudo code for simulation.
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Figure 3: Uniform Distribu-
tion.
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Figure 4: Varying Distribu-
tions.
In Figure 3 the Simulation Uniform curve overlaps with theMoV-
InG curve, which demonstrates the correctness of the model. The
estimated loss for ad-networks is 3%−12% higher when increased
contention is not captured. This is expected because increased con-
tention increases the revenue for the auctioneer, thus reducing the
loss. Parameter values in real world scenario may be higher than
the ones used in our numerical evaluation; however, this does not
cause any loss of generality because the results only depend on the
relative values of the parameters. We also study the effect of vary-
ing A, S and U , but omit the results in the interest of space.
Figure 4 shows the loss in revenue (using simulations) when bids
are picked from distributions other than uniform. The shape of the
loss functions are similar, but just shifted depending on the bid dis-
tribution. Three Beta distributions B(α, β) are considered with r
= 1: (i) B(1, 3), (ii) B(2, 2), and (iii) B(5, 1). The loss is higher
(48.6% with B(5, 1) vs 37% with B(1, 3) at S′ = 200) when dis-
tribution is skewed towards upper limit (i.e., α > β) as the initial
revenue from such a bid distribution is very high. No Auction still
has highest loss estimate: 50% at S′ = 200. A case where advertis-
ers draw bids from different ranges is also considered. The lower
limit and upper limit of the range are picked, for each advertiser,
uniformly between 0 and 1 and a uniform distribution within this
range is used to draw bids. The result is similar to the one obtained
with all advertisers picking bids according to a uniform distribution
with the same range (45% with same range and 46% with different
ranges at S′ = 200).
Resemblance to Monotone Hazard Rate curves: The Equa-
tions 1 and 2 are forms of 1− 1
x
, thus have a decreasing slope and
look like MHR curves which arise in a number of applications [4].
2.2 Generalized Expression
Here we derive an expression, for general bidding distributions.
Methodology: We derive the expression by ﬁtting a large num-
ber of simulations run for different scenarios. From Eq. 2 under
uniform bidding, and furthermore from the MHR shape of the sim-
ulation curves, we ﬁnd that the loss L is a polynomial function in
the following variables: S, S′, A and U . Our goal is to have a
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Figure 5: Accuracy of general expression.
model which is: (i) general and applicable to a variety of scenarios,
(ii) has low error, and (iii) is simple and does not over-ﬁt the data.
We run simulations for varying A, S, S′ and U giving us 189
data points. We further use different bid distributions: (i) Uniform
U(0, 1), (ii) Beta B(1, 3), B(2, 2), and B(5, 1) and (iii) Uniform,
bidders have different ranges, upper and lower limits picked uni-
formly between 0 and 1. This gives total of 945 data points to ﬁt
the model. We then write a general polynomial as
L = x1U
x2 + x3A
x4 + x5S
x6 + x7S
′x8 +
x9U
x10Ax11 + ...+
x27U
x28Ax29Sx30 + ...+
x43U
x44Ax45Sx46S′
x47 + x48
where xi’s are the unknowns and i is the index of each unknown.
The unknowns include coefﬁcients and exponents.
We solve a non-linear optimization problem to minimize the sum
of squares of residuals. Once we obtain the coefﬁcients and the ex-
ponents, we add additional terms to see if that helps accuracy (e.g.,
multiple exponents per term). We ﬁnd that this does not improve
the accuracy. Thus, for simplicity, we use above equation.
The expression thus obtained is still quite complex and may over-
ﬁt for the simulation results. To further simplify it, we construct a
linear system of equations and solve for x inM ∗x = b. HereM is
a matrix of terms where rows correspond to different observations
and columns correspond to different terms with exponents given by
the above step, b is a vector of the real observed losses in simula-
tions and x is a vector of unknowns specifying the new coefﬁcients
of the terms. We try to obtain a sparse solution for x through ℓ1
norm minimization [1]. As shown in [9], the minimal ℓ1 norm so-
lution often coincides with the most sparse solution for many large
linear systems. This avoids over-ﬁtting the data and identiﬁes most
important factors. Thus we obtain ﬁnal general model as:
L = 0.40 ∗ U0.17 + 1.69 ∗A0.11 + 0.02 ∗ S0.11 +
0.17 ∗A0.11 ∗ S0.11 −
0.17 ∗
U0.20 ∗A0.13
S′0.01
− 0.07 ∗
U0.20 ∗ S0.14
S′0.01
−
1.60 ∗
A0.10 ∗ S0.10
S′0.07
+
0.02 ∗ U0.25 ∗A0.16 ∗ S0.16 ∗ S′0.04
Note that one of the signiﬁcant terms (in bold face) contains S
S′
which is not surprising as the Eq. 2 contains the same term.
Accuracy of the general expression: In Figure 5 we plot the curve
from the general expression along with the other simulation curves
considered for the ﬁtting. This is with our default parameters. Even
though we look for a sparse solution, the accuracy of the model is
very good (i.e., within the range of B distributions).
We further quantify the error of the model, by evaluating scenar-
ios other than the ones considered for ﬁtting. We once again vary
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Figure 6: Loss in revenue in real data-set with simple queries.
A, S, S′ and U to give 64 data points (different from ones used
for ﬁtting). Further we run this for several bid distributions: (i)
U(0, 1), (ii) B(0.5, 0.5) and (iii) B(2, 5). We observe that the gen-
eral expression, captures the loss in revenue accurately with 6.8%
mean relative error (= 1
k
∗
∑
k
i=1
abs(actual lossi−estimated lossi)
actual lossi
)
with k = 64 ∗ 3 = 192 trials.
3. TRACE DRIVEN EVALUATION
Here, we use MoVInG on a real data-set. We assume the full
data-set from a large CSP to be the most precise data-set D. We
construct synthetic D′s assuming some attributes to be absent. We
ﬁrst consider simple queries, i.e., queries on single attributes.
Gender: Given 18024 users with gender information, for varying
number of advertisers, we assume 50% of advertisers are interested
in advertising to males and the rest 50% to females. If gender infor-
mation is available (D), average size of users satisfying the query
S = 18024
2
= 9012 and if gender is unavailable (D′), S′ = 18, 024.
In Figure 6 (a), we plot the loss in revenue with varying levels of
average competition. We deﬁne average competition as A∗S
U
, i.e.,
the average number of advertisers, interested in each impression
auctioned. The fact that loss of revenue with average competition
of 10 is already over 0.44means that the loss of gender information
is already cutting the revenue almost by half (it is not exactly at 0.5,
because the effect of increased artiﬁcial competition compensates
for some loss). Moreover, fractional loss increases with increase
in real competition, because at higher competition levels, artiﬁcial
competition doesn’t help as much.
Age: We vary average competition as above and assume that ad-
vertisers are interested in users of any age with equal probability.
From the data-set we have age information of 14, 348 users. We
divide them into 6 age groups 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64,
and 65+. D is the data-set with exact age information available: S
= 196.5 and D′ is the data-set without age information available
but age group information available, S′ = 2, 391.33. In Figure 6
(b), we plot the loss in revenue comparing S and S′. We see that
loss is over 90% because the difference between S and S′ is large.
Composite Queries: Here, we consider an example composite
query, i.e., query on multiple attributes, e.g., a jeweler wants to
advertise to all users that are female and in age group 25− 34, i.e.,
query Q = (25 ≤ v(aage) < 35 ∧ v(agender) = Female).
Suppose we have advertisers, each interested in one of the 12
queries in Table 2. Also suppose universe is the people who have
age and gender information in our data-set: U = 13, 598with males
= 8, 612 and females = 4, 986. Thus average set size S′no age if no
age group information is 6, 799. From the table, if both age group
and gender are available, average set size S = 1, 133 and average
set size S′no gender if only age group is available is 2, 266. Fraction
of revenue lost, with S′no gender = 0.45 and with S
′
no age = 0.80
(with average competition with respect to precise set n = 10).
Queries Gender Age Group Count Total Count
Q1 Male 1 2716 4450
Q2 Female 1 1734
Q3 Male 2 2423 4317
Q4 Female 2 1894
Q5 Male 3 2559 3517
Q6 Female 3 958
Q7 Male 4 769 1106
Q8 Female 4 337
Q9 Male 5 118 169
Q10 Female 5 51
Q11 Male 6 27 39
Q12 Female 6 12
Table 2: Composite query on gender and age.
As expected, the loss is higher if age group is not available, than
when gender is not available as the S′no age is 6× larger than S and
S′no gender is only 2× larger than S.
4. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Two directions will be followed in future work: ﬁrst different
from the assumption in this work, the ad-network may use a strat-
egy wherein they do not include a user in the returned set if the
information required by the query is unavailable. Thus user-set re-
turned maybe smaller in case of D′ than in case of D. It will be
interesting to study the mix of these two strategies. Second, we
have ignored the strategic aspects of bidding. However, what will
be the bidding strategy of an advertiser interested inD when she is
only allowed to target D′? Recent research on game theoretic and
equilibrium analysis in presence of auctions with information [10,
2] could be used as a starting point to extend our work.
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